Endorsing this assumption, I'd like to emphasize (and to understand) the structural relationship between history, considered as the course of human acts before every kind of interpretative attempt; law, as a means oriented to create a constructive order of the historical reality and narrative, as a means aimed to frame and explain the different looks of the historical existence. In this perspective I could find an assonance with Duncan Kennedy's thought on the problematic and dialectical relation of law to development.
5
superseding the structural mystery of accessibility that lays the Kafkian doorkeeper in front of an ever-open gate. So the Law is "presenced" guarding the normative strength of an original, inexpressible arcanum. For literary quotations, I'm referring to C. Schmitt Law and Legal Thought: 1850 -1968 , Suffolk 36 Univ. L. Rev. 631 (2003 .
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I also agree with Patrick Glenn on the crucial role assigned to the notion of pastness, as a meaningful concept that claims to be investigated when cultural heritage is at stake.
6
But my consent becomes strained when Patrick Glenn tries to find a substitutive term, asserting that "this is a very odd and cumbersome word, which a poet might normally avoid".
7 I think that this is a real wrong done to T. S. Eliot. In fact the attempted research does not reach a satisfactory result: Glenn is persuaded that there is not correspondence between pastness, history and age, so these terms could not be used as interchangeable words that define the elements of a tradition. As Glenn says, age is not a fine alternative, because although a young age is entirely possible, a young tradition is more problematical. History cannot replace 'pastness' because it has become a social science and generally a social science seeks to avoid normative statements. These arguments stir my doubts and make me prey to the devouring maw of skepticism. Firstly because, in my opinion, they compare the formation of a tradition with the problem of pastness, that is something more and different, implying the individual perception of the flow of time that builds the collective consciousness of past and present. Secondly because the definition of history in terms of social science is not so obvious and consequently the proposed corollary is not so sure. Therefore even Patrick Glenn has to ascertain that the empty throne, after the dead of the omnipotent pastness, cannot be occupied by other authority.
8
This is a story that involves the language of legitimation and illusory usurpation. Now, if we read Eliot's splendid work, Tradition and the Individual Talent, not contenting ourselves with easy quotations, we can catch the profundity of his thought and we can also understand the inevitable link that connects law with literature as different forms of social drama. Here pastness is a precise qualification of the past which moves from its sensory and emotional perception. Pastness is other than past. It is a very heideggerian depiction of the ontology of the perceived past, and in this perspective I'd like to say that pastness gives expression to the consciousness of the past, as Da-sein gives expression to the consciousness which belongs to Being.
9
Inevitably, as the result of a human perception, pastness contains the implicit recall to the present and it compels and becomes part of a narrative, which lays beyond the records of the past. Both of these elements are specified by Eliot where he says: "This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his contemporaneity".
10
As P.G. Ellis brilliantly has highlighted, there is a train of thought which links Eliot with some of the critical ideas of the eighties and nineties to a greater extent than he was aware or perhaps would admit: there is a common vocabulary concerning history, development, memory and tradition traceable from Pater and Wilde, through Yeats to Eliot.
11
In my view, the aforesaid literary quotations are pivotal for the matter we're discussing and they acquired a further evocative meaning when we are dealing with the Common Law Tradition. They introduce the centrality of narrative in the constitutive process of a tradition, as a means deputed to form a structure of memory with a specific language and rhetoric devices that conjugate the speech of law in the present according to a distinctive appearance of the past. And then the different forms of collective memories offer a complex bulk of practices (of repetition, 9 I'm referring to the heidegerrian question of Being, and my specific purpose is to emphasize that Heidegger's concern is ontological and existential. This casts light on a much more underlying structure of historical time and consciousness. M. 291 (1972) . Here P.G. Ellis points out that "That Eliot's theory of tradition is one becoming rather than of moments of classical stasis is perhaps the greatest point of connection between him and other figures, but the points of detail reveal a closer similarity in their w ays of thinking. All use the terminology of the biological sciences, of organic growth and development, to describe the process by w hich tradition is formed and a language deriving from Platonism to describe the relationship between the present and the past, between the individual and tradition".
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5 inscription and representation) as a justificatory argument now for a scriptural law, now for a discourse of precedent. In this perspective, as P. Goodrich clearly remarks, a tradition is a language of transmission that allows law to be living and lived. But, as every other kind of language, even tradition matches with the question of the legitimacy of reference of faith in the linguistic encoding of reality.
12
On the basis of these premises I'd like to investigate the active role played by the legal profession in the formulation of a foundational narrative with the structure of a legal tradition. At this aim my arguments are comparative and historical; my approach is of political theology and my attention is attracted by the possibility of an aesthetics of law. I'll start with the analysis of the Common Law Tradition, then I'll try to compare my conclusions with the peculiarities of the Civil Law Tradition. I interpret the history of the English Law, and especially the dialectics between Common Law and Equity, as a form of communication of two 12 P. Goodrich, op. cit., 17; 7, where we can find a bright analysis of the mutual relationship betw een 'legal tradition', as a specific form of language, and the sources of legitimacy. Here Goodrich observes that 'the faith attributed to and necessary for the working of any existent language system is a question of its legitimacy; the law fulness not only of its reference but also of its use is predicated upon its source, its institutional provenance, its badge or other insignia of office.
[…] The legal tradition founds the legitimacy of social speech; it institutes an order of lawful discourse and prohibits those heterodoxies of speech or writing that are deemed to threaten the security of legal meaning or the order of legal and political reason' (added emphasis is mine). The definition of law as a function of text and language is the real kernel of Ian Ward's thought, as it has been developed in I. Ward, Shakespeare and the Legal Imagination, 1 (1 st ed. 1999). Introducing the purposes of his book, Ward points out the structural connection among the proper nature of law, the real form of legal legitimacy and law and literature approach as the better tool for understanding legal imagination. In this perspective Ward suggest that 'if law is indeed a literary expression, then its subjects subjugate themselves as readers and audiences. Subjugation becomes an engagement w ith texts; we subjugate ourselves to those texts which we accept, whether or not our acceptance is encouraged by our reason, our superstition or merely by fear of punishment. In other words, the legitimacy of law, the extent to which we accept it as valid, whether it be rational, providential or simply effective, rests, in the final analysis, in our collective and individual political imagination. A text is legitimate if an audience, for whatever reason, chooses to grant it that legitimacy.
[…] The legitimacy of law rested in the political imagination of its subjects […] It will be suggested, then, that a legal order or constitution is a product of the imagination, as indeed is a piece of literature such as a Shakespearian play.
[…] Literature plays an essential role in fashioning a mutable legal imagination'; I. Ward, op. cit., 1-2.
COMPARAT IVE LAW REVIEW -Vol.1 6 different languages that shape the political debate: respectively the language of Law and the language of Theology.
13 My concern is to cast light on the basic structure of political arguments and its codes as they had moulded the forms of communication and transmission of the law. In this perspective, in another essay, I h ave described the opposite process that involved the development of Common Law and Equity as an alternative motion towards or against a theological reconstruction of the system of law .
14 The same process implied the elaboration of different aesthetics and the communication of a divergent rhetoric of power. I think that the history of the Common Law is based on the double, inviolable and unquestionable Dominium granted to the common lawyers: the privileged inhabitants of the Inns of Court were the holders of a kind of self-governing influence not only over the sphere of Law, but also on the representative strategies of its rational and historical foundation. They were the skilful selectors of the means of expression of political power and authority of Law. The option for an absence of textual codification compels that the legitimacy of the legal institutions, and of the constitution that it embodies, is established with reference to a system of representations and visual signs. This is the question of the Presence of Law 15 , of how Law is presenced in social life.
13 During my investigation on Equity, I became persuaded that Equity represented a kind of reserve (not only residuary) power granted to the King on a political and theological level, a kind of not only institutionalized, but also naturalized power to decide the state of exception at the aim to reassert the sovereignty of the Crown against conflicting pow ers. 14 C. Costantini, The Judicature Acts and the con-fusion of Law and Equity, in Practising Equity, Addressing Law: Equity in Law and Literature (ed. D. Carpi), 91 ff. (1st. ed. 2008). 15 I'm indebted to Peter Goodrich for the use of this expression as it has been clarified from its proper etymological root. The original perspective, combining Benveniste's and Marin's thought, is closely related to my own attempt to justify the history of law w ith arguments derived from political theology. Presence is from prae-sens, that is something both before and in advance the senses, 'an anticipation and an imminence that negates, suspends both time and space by the virtue of the pow er of the event, of a sacrament'; P. Goodrich, op. cit., 57. The Author quotes L. Marin, when he says 'if being present (prae-sens) does not signify being there, to be in front of, but to be before, ahead of, at the tip of, in anticipation or excess, without any apparent continuity between behind and before […] being there comes to signify an imminent temporality'; L. Marin, La Parole mangée at autres essays theologico-politiques, 210 (1st. ed. 1986 ). Moving from this evocative quotations, Goodrich argues that presence is indexical, in excess of the immediate, imminent, the bearer of a history, a predefined alchemical being. The follow ing remark is particularly interesting for my perspective of political theology, as the better paradigm fitted to understand the darker side of Law , its complex ontology. In fact Goodrich specifies that 'it is also the law, not simply because it is that presence, that geneaology, that parental power
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The enunciation of the rules, that is their formulation by the means of words, is combined with other significant and as much eloquent forms of communication or transmission. These forms are often meta-juridical and use a bulk of symbols to make visible the dark side of the power. Then, speaking of a liturgical, sacramental, ritual nature of the legal discourse in the English legal history, I want to pay attention to the different ways chosen for manifesting the presence of the Law. Law is constituted even by a sapiential art that allows its visibility and at the same time represents the ground on which governmentality expresses the aesthetics of law: a specific kind of art "that manipulates the perception of the signs so that the subject of law attaches itself willingly to the authority of the legal institutions".
16
First of all the exclusive participation to the elite of serjeants at law was accomplished by an elaborate ritual and by a long vocational training that allowed the selected members to master the secret, esoteric and authoritative knowledge of law. The evocative words of Sir John Fortescue define the sacerdotal role of the English Legal profession, and they closely recall the theological dimension so to understand the jurisprudence as a form of theology, the meaning and content of which could be expounded only by common lawyers. I'm obviously referring to the following passage of De Laudibus Legum Angliae "we, who are the Ministerial Officers who sit and preside in the Court of justice, are therefore not improperly called Sacerdotes The import of the latin word (sacerdos) being one who gives or teaches Holy Things". , is essential for the construction of the genealogy of Common Law. In fact, despite its uncertain provenance, Common Law was depicted by its apologists as unimpeachable insofar as it take origin from an absolute, divine original. For its inner and mystical history the English Common Law becomes one of the most vivid embodiments of political-theology discourse, another expression of the 'Word of God' for a 'chosen people', that -in some measure -casts doubt on the uniqueness of Hebrew Law.
22
On these grounds the common lawyers depicted their proper representation as the nobility of Law, claiming to be the cliquish authors of the truthful tradition and the sacralised keepers of the arcane of law, the mouthpieces of a godly rule set apart from the social community. This remark allows us to connect on the one hand the sphere of Law with the realm of Theology and on the other the plastic elocution of the political sovereignty of the Crown with the iconic portrayal of the masters of the Law. Now the commonwealth of lawyers made use of its space, of its dress, and of its rituals to frame the unwritten truth of the Constitution in the framework of a thoughtless time. I perfectly agree with Paul Raffield when he says that 'common law was manifested and revealed to its disciples through the oral traditions of its exclusive communities, but for those subjects of law who did not have access to these rites legitimacy and authority were communicated through an alternative system of signs '. 25 In this perspective I think that even the buildings of the Inns of Court were repositories for the memory of law, and then their architecture contributed to the construction of the Common Law Tradition. I have noted 26 that Temple Bar is the concrete paradigm of Assmann's theory, according which the Temple is the perfect embodiment of a 'monumental discourse' as a means used by the State to show itself and the superior divine order as its ontological archetype. In itself, the Temple is a 'nomos', a chosen place where the Law is fulfilled and ritually acted. It's also a tridimensional version of a Book with all the characteristics of a 'Canon'. This was Temple Bar: the privileged and only one site where Common Law was physically announced by the structures of the Inns as well as God is embodied in His Ecclesia and He's renewed in the Holy Communion: hoc est corpus meum. In the same logic I'd like to make a very short, but I think suggestive reference to the regulation of the image at the Inns of Court. It is generally known that clothes have a representational power: they are concrete signs and emblems through which the societal status of individual subjects (the status et gradus to quote the hendiadys we can find in the writs for the call to the Bar) had been identifiable. During Tudor times sumptuary legislation was enacted with the specific purpose to determine the political, social and cultural development of the modern English nation-state, making the Monarch the earth embodiment of divine authority, the perfect imago Dei, a secular imperium with a preeminent spiritual supremacy. Even if the community of the Inns of Court was immune from the interference of every kind of external powers and it represented a 'separated jurisdiction' beyond the secular and the ecclesiastic ones, the governing bodies of the Inns enacted their own sumptuary regulation so to clarify the duty of the legal profession to apply a specific theory of the image to its institutional existence. 'Every man of this Society should frame and reform himself for the 
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manner of his apparel '. 27 In these terms the regulation of Gray's Inn, passed in 1574, reproposed the statements of the Inner Temple Parliament legislation: the legal community claimed for its proper role of clarifying the correct use of symbols, so to clearly embody the spiritual and the temporal qualities of the Tudor settlement.
I have tried to propose my interpretation of Common Law as an antique tradition performed in a liturgical language, placed by the narrow brotherhood of common lawyers outside history and beyond memories, and designed as the intimate, incorruptible knowledge of a chosen profession. Now it is in the common lawyers' narrative that we meet with a conscious paradigm of political theology: as we have seen, the common lawyers represented their Law as the perfect embodiment of God's will so to reveal that Common Law combines two different kinds of sources, both temporal and spiritual. My aim is to highlight that in this precise historical context we can combine different declensions of political theology as they are proposed respectively by C. Schmitt and Jan Assmann. As it's well known Schmitt claims for the translation into secular and political concepts of the original religious ones.
28
On the contrary, Jan Assmann claims for the translation into theological and religious dimension of the originally secular and political dimension.
29
I re-frame the Common Law tradition as a continuous path that connects these opposed representations of political theology. Initially the narrow elite of serjeants at law took on theological attributes to legitimate and justify its exclusive dominium on and over the Law, transforming a sacerdotal ritual, that presupposes a sacramental initiation, into a codified administration of rules and remedies and imposing the origins of Law and Politics from the Theological order. Subsequently, the Monarch, conscious of the perils embedded in these exclusive privileges legitimated the sovereign power by the means of a new kind of theologized authority that laid claim even to the papal prerogatives.
What I have said is an evidence that the Law needs a physical body for its historical existence and even more for its plastic communication in social life. And the boundary line that separates the Common Law Tradition and the 12 Civil Law Tradition is precisely the different comprehension of the body of law: now it is represented as a living body of lawyers that declares and dictates the rules of law, as the only one holder of the access key to an esoteric knowledge; now it becomes a corpus iuris, a text, a book, a canon. In both cases the authority of the law asserts itself by the means of a sacralization (or theologization) of the chosen body.
30
This is the history of the narratives that are the common glue of the construction both of Common Law Tradition and of Civil Law Tradition. And this is the issue: the writing of the past, as a form of representation aiming to select memories, to plot a persuasive narrative, to derive an unitary and unbroken tradition from a bulk of different accounts. What is at stake is an uninterrupted tradition within which the Power becomes, quoting Gadamer, an anonymous authority, a legal tradition, searching for its own Ministries, Interpreters and Actors. The Ministries -I conclude -of a renewed sense of the pastness of the past.
